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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT G. SLUSHERf JR.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 19660

v.
KENNETH W. BROOKS, TODD PAUL
OSPITAL, by his personal
representative, and CURTIS
CAMPBELL,
Defendants, Respondents,
and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT OSPITAL

NATURE OF THE CASE
This

is an action brought against defendants for

personal injury damages arising from an automobile accident.
Defendant Ospital
for

wrongful

Ospital

for

cross-claimed against defendant Campbell

death

and

contribution.

Brooks was dismissed

Campbell
Early

cross-claimed

in the case, defendant

as having no involvement

bility from the accident.

against

in or lia-

Prior to trial, plaintiff settled

his claim against Ospital and trial proceeded on plaintiff's
claim and Ospitalfs cross-claim against Campbell.
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DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The jury returned a verdict finding Campbell one
hundred percent responsible on both plaintiff's claim and
Ospital's cross-claim.

Pursuant to the jury's verdict the

court entered

in favor of plaintiff for $200,000

judgment

and in favor of Ospital for $50f849.
of $200,000 was reduced

Plaintiff's judgment

by $65,000, the amount of plain-

tiff's settlement with Ospital and $2,000, the amount of no
fault benefits received.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent

Ospital seeks affirmation of

the lower court's judgment in his favor.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts contains only those
facts which most strongly support appellant's position.

To

avoid the misunderstanding that may occur from one-sided and
incomplete

facts,

it

is

necessary

to

state

the

facts

undisclosed by appellant.
This

case

arises

from

an automobile

Sardine Canyon, Cache County, Utah.

accident in

Defendant Campbell was

attempting to pass the plaintiff and five other vehicles on
a two lane road
valley

known

as

in a flat area at the bottom of a small
the

Dry

Lake

Area

of

Sardine
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Canyon.

According

to

eye

witnesses

who

were

being

passed

by

Campbell, Campbell's passing speed was from 70 to 80 miles
per hour" (witness Zucca R. Tr. 179; witness Michael Gerber
R. Tr. 290)

Plaintiff estimated Campbell's passing speed

at 65 to 70 miles per hour.

(R. Tr. 143)

As Campbell was passing he began ascending the hill
on

the north

side of

passing zone ahead.

the valley, where

(R. Ex 83-C)

there was a no-

At the same time, Ospital

was approaching in the opposite direction, coming down the
hill.

In order to avoid a head-on collision with Campbell,

Ospital attempted to swerve around Campbell but lost control
of

his

vehicle

(R.

Tr.

286-295)

Once

Ospital

began

skidding by swerving to the right, there was nothing Ospital
could have done to regain control before the collision with
plaintiff.

(R. Tr. 563-4)

Gerber, the driver of one of the cars being passed
by Campbell, witnessed the events leading to the accident.
He saw Campbell passing numerous vehicle behind him and as
he began ascending the hill he saw Ospital approaching in
the opposite direction.

He testified that when Ospital and

Campbell passed each other, Ospital had swerved on to the
shoulder of the road to miss Campbell.

Thereafter, Campbell

remained in Ospital's lane of traffic and continued passing
the

rest

of

the

Gerber observed

northbound

vehicles.

(R. Tr.

that Ospital did not appear

291-298)

to have lost

- 3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

control

of

Campbell.

his

vehicle

(R. Tr. 295)

until

after

swerving

to

avoid

His estimate of Ospital's speed

was 55 to 60 miles per hour

(R. Tr. 296)

Gerber did not

attribute any fault of the accident to Ospital.
Mr. Gerber was not present at the trial and his
deposition was read to the jury.

His deposition was taken

on June 15 f 1982, approximately one year before any settlement between plaintiff

and Ospital.

(R. Depos. Gerber).

Other than the parties, Gerber was the only eye witness who
saw both Campbell and Ospital approach and pass each other.
Appellant asserts that there is strong evidence of
a vehicle other than Campbell's that was passing and caused
Ospital to lose control.

There is no substantial evidence

to support appellant's assertion. Every witness, including
Campbell, testified that there was no other vehicle passing
at the time in question.
634)

Even

immediately
jury's

(R. Tr. 144, 181, 315, 632, and

Campbell's

initial description

before

accident,

finding

the

of Campbell's

is

of

the

consistent

interference

with

vehicle:
...as I passed it (a truck) I noticed
coming up on top of the hill a car came
into view, and I proceeded to pass, and
as I did I noticed that the closing rate
between the car coming down the hill and
I was greater than I had expected, and I
continued to pass, but I crowded back
in." (R. Tr. 425)
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events

with

the

Ospital's

The
concluded

investigating

that

by

officer,

passing, Campbell

Kent
was

Parker,

involved

accident and interred with Ospital's driving,

also

in the

(R. Tr. 711

and 716)
At the time of trial, Reynold K. Watkins, an expert
witness called
speed.

by Ospital, testified

concerning

Ospital's

Watkins is a professor of engineering at Utah State

University and has received his bachelors, masters and doctors degree in engineering.
dent

reconstruction

reconstruction

and

since
his

Campbell's expert witness.

He has been involved in acci1957.

He has

pupils

included

(R. Tr. 800)

taught

accident

Robert

Dahle,

Watkins concluded

after extensive investigation that at the time Ospital suddenly

swerved

to his right, his maximum speed would have

been 57 miles per hour and minimum speed 41 miles per hour,
with the likelihood between 45 and 50 miles per hour.
Tr.

566-568)

Watkins

explained

(Campbell's expert) had erred
Ospital's speed.

how

Trooper

(R.
Dahle

in reaching his opinion of

(R. Tr. 840-851, and 868-871)

Dahle had no engineering degree, and in addition to
his patrol duty, he farmed approximately 300 acres and sometimes

consulted

tionist.
trial

on

(R. Tr.

lasted

more

the
799)
than

side

as

an

accident

reconstruc-

The testimony of the experts at
a day, including

numerous cross-

examinations by all parties and rebuttal testimony.
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There

were numerous exhibits offered by both experts.
As
severe

a result of

injuries

the accident, plaintiff

including

several

broken

ribs,

received
punctured

lung, broken nose, numerous broken teeth, a substantial portion of muscle and flesh in the left arm were torn out and
lost, radial nerve severed, broken knee, torn ligaments in
knee and foot, and numerous lacerations and abrasions.

As a

result of these injuries, plaintiff

incurred approximately

$23,500

has

in

medical

expenses.

He

permanently

lost

substantial use of his left arm, hand, right knee and foot
and there is extensive disfigurement and scarring,

(R. Tr.

117-127)
Ospital, one of only two children in his family,
was killed.
at

Utah

He was 19 years old and on academic scholarship

State

at

the

time

of

his

death.

He

was

an

outstanding young man, with a list of achievements and credentials, including Sterling Scholar, All-state basketball
guard, grade point average of 3.96, pre-med student, and had
received

numerous

trophies

and

achievement in the community.

awards

source of great comfort and joy.

before

April

trial)

27,

counsel

1983,
for

outstanding

His parents had a very spe-

cial and close relationship with

On

for

their

son and he was a

(R. Tr. 673-695)
(approximately

Ospital

wrote

to

five

months

counsel

for

Campbell suggesting that they jointly attempt settlement of

- 6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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plaintiff's claim.

(R. Bk. Ill, 251-2)

Campbell was speci-

fically informed at that time that if he failed to settle,
Ospital would

proceed

with plaintiff.

to negotiate

a separate

settlement

The two counsel met shortly thereafter and

counsel for Campbell

informed counsel for Ospital that he

was not interested in contributing anything toward settlement.

Counsel

for Ospital then reiterated

that he would

proceed to negotiate directly with the plaintiff.

(R. Bk.

Ill, 231)
Despite

his knowledge of Ospital's

intentions to

settle, Campbell made no attempt to seek discovery—either
formally or

informally—of

the settlement agreement

until

the Friday before trial when counsel for Campbell telephoned
counsel for Ospital and was fully informed of the settlement
and its terms.

(R. Bk. Ill, 231-2)

On the morning of the trial, the court was informed
of the settlement, and Campbell presented his arguments that
the agreement was prejudicial and moved the court to bifurcate the trial or to introduce evidence of the settlement.
(HP. 1-11, 15-7).

The trial court ruled that the case should

go forward on its pleadings and that evidence of the settlement be excluded.

(T. 25-6)

However, in order to protect

against possible prejudice, counsel stipulated that Ospital
would not lead plaintiff's witnesses on cross-examination.
(T. 18).

Moreover, during trial and in closing argument,

- 7
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Campbell was allowed to argue that plaintiff and Ospital
were acting as alligned parties and to suggest that they had
an agreement to help each other out.

(T. 923-4).

ARGUMENT
>

POINT I: THE NON DISCLOSURE TO THE JURY OF THE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND OSPITAL DID NOT PREJUDICE
CAMPBELL NOR DENY HIM A FAIR TRIAL
Campbell broadly alleges on this appeal that he
was prejudiced and denied a fair trial because of the nondisclosure to the jury of settlement between plaintiff and
Ospital.

Relying on cases involving settlement agreements

commonly referred to as "Mary Carter agreements", he asserts
that the trial court committed prejudicial error in not
bifurcating the trial or introducing evidence of settlement.
Campbell's cited cases are entirely

inappositef however,

because the settlement agreement in this case was not a Mary
Carter agreement or even similar to one.

Moreoverf trial

was conducted in a manner to avoid any possible prejudice to
Campbell resulting from the settlement agreement.
A. The Settlement Between Plaintiff and Defendant
Ospital does Not Constitute a "Mary Carter Agreement."
"Mary Carter agreement" is the term commonly used
to refer to settlement agreements between the plaintiff and
one

or

more—but

not

all—of

the defendants, with

- 8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the

distinguishing feature that the settling defendant agrees to
pay the plaintiff a certain amount with the understanding
that the amount will be reduced or extinguished by any recovery the plaintiff acquires from the non-settling defendant.
In order to further its purposef the agreement is kept secret

from

the

other

parties

and

the

settling

defendant

remains a party at trial where he actively works to aid the
plaintiff's case.

See, e.g., Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594

P.2d 354 (Okla. 1978); Vermont Union School District No. 21
v. H.P. Cummings Construction Co., 469 A.2d 742 (Vt. 1933).
As
agreement

this

description

reached

agreement.

in

this

makes
case

clear, the
is

not

a

settlement

Mary

Carter

(A copy of the applicable settlement agreement

is provided at the end of this brief for reference.)

The

settlement agreement here provided simply that Ospital would
pay plaintiff $65,000 and in return receive a release of all
claims.

Plaintiff

further

agreed

to reduce any judgment

against Campbell by the settlement amount.
21-3).
tion

of

(R. Bk. Ill,

Ospital retained ho right to recover back any pora

judgment

against

Campbell

nor

was

there

any

agreement of Ospital to secretly aid the plaintiff as a condition of the settlement.

Thus the most objectionable ele-

ments of a Mary Carter agreement were absent in this case.
The trial court and Campbell were fully aware of
the existence of the agreement at the time, of trial.
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The

trial

court,

after

hearing

and

considering

Campbell's

motions for bifurcation or admission of the settlement into
evidence, exercised its discretion to deny those motions and
provided certain safeguards to prevent prejudice to Campbell
and

avoid

prejudice

to

plaintiff

and

Ospital.

This

situation was entirely different from that typical of Mary
Carter agreements, where the agreement is kept secret until
the plaintiff dismisses the settling defendant at the close
of the evidence but before the jury deliberations.

See,

e.g., Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
Campbell complains

that he was not told of the

agreement until shortly before trial and implies that the
settling
There

parties

had

a duty

to

is no authority proffered

disclose

the

agreement.

for this position.

This

court has held that a party has a duty to disclose information

only when

rules

of

it

procedure.

is requested

in conformity with

the

Transamerica Title Insurance Co. v.

United Resources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (1970)
In any event, approximately 5 months before trial,
Ospital

had

informed

Campbell

that

he

would

attempt

a

separate settlement with plaintiff because Campbell did not
wish to participate.
mal
Under

or

informal

Yet at no time did Campbell seek for-

discovery

of

the

settlement

agreement.

these circumstances, he should not now be heard to

complain of any alleged prejudice

resulting

from his own
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failure

to discover

the settlement of which he had prior

notice.
Moreover, even if this were a Mary Carter agreement
(which

it clearly was not) , Campbell had

discovery of the agreement.
551 P. 2d 449

a duty to seek

In Grille v. Burke's Paint Co.,

(Or. 1976), the non-settling defendant argued

he was entitled to a new trial on the ground

that he was.

not aware of the Mary Carter agreement prior to trial.

The

court rejected that argument by making the following observation:

However, du Pont made no effort to discover
the existence or the terms of the agreement
despite the fact that it had been repeatedly
informed by
Burkefs that it intended to
settle with plaintiff. Du Pont may not have
actually known of the particular kind of
settlement which was contemplated, but,
under the circumstances of this case, du
Pont should have been aware that Burke's was
attempting to protect itself from any and
all adverse consequences of this action.
551 P.2d at 453.
See also Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385
Carter

agreement

must

be

produced

when

(Fla. 1973)
requested

appropriate rules of procedure) .
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(Mary
under

B.
The Adversary Nature And Integrity Of The
Trial Was Protected By The Existence Of Ospital's
Cross-Claim Against Campbell And The Trial Court's
Conducting Of The Trial.
Despite the clear fact that this was not a Mary
Carter

agreement, Campbell

nonetheless

argues

that

the

agreement was analogous to a Mary Carter agreement and was
thus prejudicial to him.

Specifically, he charges that the

adversary nature of the trial was undermined because Ospital
was allowed to remain at trial when he had already settled
with plaintiff.
The most prejudicial

aspect of the Mary Carter

agreement is that because of the settling defendant's secret
financial interest in the plaintiff's claim, he can remain
in trial and covertly aid the plaintiff.

In those cases,

the settling defendant may abandon defenses earlier pleaded
that were adverse to the plaintiff's case, openly admit that
none of the defendants have a meritorious defense, or admit
that the plaintiff's claimed damages are reasonable.

When

these admissions come from a defendant who has no claim of
his own against a non-settling defendant and ostensibly is
at trial solely to defend against the plaintiff's claim, the
jury is left with no explanation for such "candor" and is
left to conclude that the plaintiff's claim is valid and the
non-settling defendant is only stubbornly and unreasonably
resisting

it.

See, generally,

Lum v. Stinnett, supra;
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Annot. 65 A.L.R. 3d 602 (1975).
It is further argued that the non-settling defendant

in

settling

a

Mary

Carter

parties1

case

is

advantageous

also

prejudiced

by

the

use of procedural devices.

The settling defendant, as an adverse party, is free to lead
the

plaintiff's

witnesses

on ostensible

cross-examination

and fillB in gaps left by the plaintiff in direct examination.

Lum v Stinnett, supra, is an excellent example of

such prejudicial effects of a Mary Carter agreement.
the settling

defendants

reserved

their

opening

There,

statement,

thus forcing the nonsettling defendant to do the same or be
left

with

no

way

"co-defendants."

to

rebut

the

later

and

of

his

The settling defendants were allowed, over

objection, to lead the plaintiff's
will,

argument

then

successfully

"adverse" witnesses at

object

to

further

cross-

examination by the non-settling defendant.
The proceedings in the present case stand in sharp
contrast

to

vigorously
for

the

such

practices.

attempted

accident.

It

is

to prove Campbell
However, Ospital's

true

that

solely

Ospital

responsible

interest

was

not

because of the settlement with plaintiff but was due to his
cross-claim

for

wrongful

death,

which

would

have

been

pursued in the same manner even if settlement had not been
reached with plaintiff.

The jury knew of Ospital's cross-

claim from the beginning and was thus in a position to pro-
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perly

evaluate

evidence.

weigh

the

credibility

of

Ospital's

Campbell was free to argue any bias of-Ospital's

position.

Indeed, trial was conducted

same manner
initially

and

in essentially the

it would have been had plaintiff

joined

their

claims

and Ospital

as co-plaintiffs, which

is

explicitly authorized by Rule 20, Utah R.Civ.P.
Moreover, Ospital gained
because of the settlement.

no procedural

advantage

To avoid prejudice to Campbell,

the trial court ruled that the two settling parties would
not be allowed
examination.

to lead

each other's witnesses on cross-

Since the court was fully aware of the settle-

ment and the arguments as to possible prejudice, it was in a
position

to

closely

monitor

the

proceedings.

Following

trial, the court explicitly considered this problem in its
memorandum decision and stated:
As to any collusion, this court was present
and observed the whole trial, observed no
collusion between attorneys for Ospital and
Slusher.
In fact, Counsel for Slusher
questioned all witnesses of both Campbell and
Ospital as though adversary to his position
that Slusher was not negligent, had no liability, and that he didn't know who was liable
but it had to be one or other defendant or
both. (R. Bk. IV. 46).
In both his opening statement, (T.82), and closing argument,
(T.886), counsel for Slusher

stated that his position was

merely that Ospital or Campbell, or both, were responsible
for plaintiff's injuries.
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Campbell
testimony

repeatedly

points

to

as an example of prejudice.

Knightfs

testimony

Knightfs

Newell

An examination of

reveals no such prejudice.

On direct

examination plaintiff elicited from Knight merely that "the
gray car would have been a factor" in causing the accident
(T.

374).

Contrary to Campbell's assertions, this testi-

mony was designed to rebut Campbell's contention that he was
not negligent and it was clearly consistent with the plaintiff's claim that one or both of the defendants were responsible.

At no time did Knight ever testify that Ospital was

not negligent or had nothing to do with the cause of the
accident.
Plaintiff did not question Knight as to the speed
of Ospital's car or attempt to prove that Ospital was not
speeding.

In fact, Knight admitted that he did not have an

opinion of Ospital's exact speed.

His testimony on cross-

examination by Ospital was merely that Ospital could not be
traveling

as fast as Campbell claimed he was.

(T. 386).

The critical testimony in establishing Ospital's speed was
given

by

Reynold

Watkins,

(T. 565-9),

an

expert

witness

retained and called by Ospital.
C.

Campbell Benefited From The Settlement

The settlement agreement provided that the plaintiff

would

reduce

his

claim

by

the

amount

of
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Ospital's

payment

($65f000), and

in any event, plaintiff

would

not

take judgment against Campbell for any more than Campbell's
prorata

share

of

negligence.

This

directly

benefited

Campbell in the following ways:
(1)

The

$65f000

reduction

of

plaintiff's

claim

applied regardless of the extent of Campbell's fault.
greater Campbell's fault the more he stood to gain.

The
As it

turned out, the jury found Campbell 100 percent at fault and
Campbell

received

the

full

benefit

of

Ospitals

payment

without being exposed to a contribution claim from Ospital
for

the $65,000.

settling

joint

(I 78-27-40

tort-feasor

t 1 ! U.C.A provides that the

cannot

pursue

a

contribution

claim against another joint tort-feasor whose liability is
not extinguished by that settlement.)
(2)
proportionate

Campbell's exposure would
share

of

negligence.

be limited
In

other

to his

words, he

would have been severally liable to the plaintiff for the
whole injury without the settlement even though his negligence

would

have

only

i 78-27-40 C2J U.C.A.

been

25

percent

of

the

fault,

Since Ospital was killed in the acci-

dent, and had no assets in his estate (except the automobile
insurance R. Tr. 502,620), Campbell would have had the risk
of possibly paying more than his proportionate share of the
damages, had there been no settlement.
Clearly, Campbell was not prejudiced by the settle-
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ment between plaintiff

and Ospital.

Quite

the contrary,

Campbell benefited greatly by Ospitalfs payment of $65,000
of the liability

for which Campbell would otherwise

have

been responsible.
POINT II:

The

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED
EVIDENCE OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

foregoing

argument makes

clear

that

in this

case there was no prejudice to Campbell resulting from the
settlement and subsequent manner in which the trial was conducted.
dence

Even if there were some prejudice to Campbell, eviof

settlement

would

result

in

prejudice

to

all

parties.
A.

Evidence Of Settlement Agreements Is
Inadmissible At Trial And Would Result In
Prejudice To All Parties.

Campbell argues that the trial court should have
admitted into evidence the Settlement Agreement.
strong

Utah has a

policy against admitting evidence of settlement in

trial, as expressed

in Utah Code Ann., i 78-27-30, which

provides in pertinent part:
No settlement, partial settlement or voluntary
payment
under
section
78-27-29
shall be
admissible in any action as evidence prior to
judgment.
On September 1, 1983, less than two weeks before
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trial

began,

Evidence.

Utah

courts

adopted

the

Federal

Rules

of

Rule 408 of the new rules provides in pertinent

part:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or
promising to furnish or (2) accepting or
offering
or
promising
to
accept, a
valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was
disputed as to either validity or amount,
is not admissible to prove liability for
or invalidity of the claim or its amount.
. . .
. This rule also does not require
exclusion when the evidence is offered for
another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
In
clearly

light

acted

of

these

properly

and

provisions,
within

excluding the settlement agreement.

the

its

trial

court

discretion

in

It has been repeatedly

held that evidence of a settlement agreement entered into by
the plaintiff

and one of the defendants

is inadmissible.

McHann v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 713 F.2d
Cir.

161 (5th

1983); Young v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 539 F.Supp.

193 (E.D.Pa. 1982).
In

Slayton v. Ford Motor Co.,

435

A.2d

946

(Vt.

1981), the court discussed the reasons why admission of a
settlement agreement is potentially prejudicial to both the
plaintiff and the non-settling defendant;

If the jury is informed of either the fact
or the amount of a settlement, there is a
- 18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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danger that it will draw improper inferences.
A jury might conclude that the
settling defendant was the party primarily
responsible for the injury, and that the
remaining defendant should therefore be
exonerated.
It might take the amount of
the settlement as a measure of the plaintiff's damages.
It might consider one
defendant's settlement to be an admission
of negligence, and then impute this negligence to a nonsettling defendant.
435
A. 2d at 947 (citations omitted).
It

was

precisely

this

type

of

concern—and

in

addition, the prejudice which would have resulted to Ospital
on

his

cross-claim—which

prompted

exclude evidence of the settlement.

the

trial

court

to

The court stated in its

memorandum decision:

Cllf the court had allowed the settlement
agreement as to Ospital and Slusher before
the jury, this would certainly place the
jury in a position of looking at the
agreement as an admission by Ospital of
negligence and liability. Simply because
Counsel for Ospital decided to settle
without admitting liability, this he is
entitled to do rather than risk possibly a
larger claim if he didn't settle.
But
this in no way constitutes an admission of
negligence or liability on the part of
Todd Ospital and to allow the agreement to
go before the jury would certainly give
that impression and would unduly prejudice
Ospital in his counterclaim.
(R. Bk. IV,
45).
The prejudice which would have resulted from introducing evidence of the settlement clearly outweighs any prejudice Campbell claims to have resulted from not admitting
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it.

Rule 403f Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that evi-

dence, even though relevant, may be excluded if its probative

value

is substantially

outweighed

things, "unfair prejudice".

by, among

other

See also Bill Currie Ford,

Inc. v. Cash, 252 So. 2d 407

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)

(Admission of the settlement agreement would perhaps have
aided the non-settling defendant, but would have prejudiced
the settling defendant,and was properly excluded.
A

further

reason for excluding

evidence of the

settlement is the chilling effect such action would have on
future settlements.

As discussed

brief, Ospital, or any other

in Point III of this

settling

defendant has to

remain a party at the trial to litigate the proportionate
fault between himself and other tort-feasors in order to
gain protection from the contribution claims.

If a court

must admit the settlement agreement under these circumstances, the incentive of plaintiffs to settle their claims
would unquestionably be damaged.

This would be directly

contrary to the policy of this state in favor of settlement.
Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service
Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).
B.
Introduction Of The Settlement Agreement Into
Evidence Would Have Added Little To The Jury's Understanding
Of The Case And The Relationship Of The Parties.
In

addition

to

the prejudice which

would

have

resulted had the settlement been admitted, there is little
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or nothing

that would have been gained by its admission.

Campbell fully exploited his opportunity to prove any

bias

Knight might have had in favor of Ospital by questioning him
on cross-examination as to who retained him and who paid him
to

testify.

Knight

candidly

admitted

to

the

jury

that

Ospital's attorney had made the initial contact with him and
had provided him with the Investigating Officer's report.
(T. 387-8).
Most importantly, counsel for Campbell was allowed
to argue the alleged collusion between plaintiff and Ospital
in his closing argument to the jury:
Now I'd like to get into this case itself
and some of the facts. Now one fact I
think you folks probably observed Day
One, when we had the introduction of the
witnesses and the opening statements, and
which carried through all the way to the
closing argument of Mr. Barrett, is they
are trying to hang the wrap on Mr.
Campbell alone, period. Did you hear one
word where they're talking about what did
Mr. Ospital do wrong?
Uh-uh.
Well,
let's go back a little further and evaluate that.
We were told when we gave a witness list
that Mr. Knight had been retained by Mr.
Barrett. We were told by Mr. Knight that
he hadn't even seen Mr. Barrett until
right here five minutes before he went on
the witness stand, that he had been contacted by Mr. Humpherys and given information and all this good stuff.
You
know, years ago my grandfather told me
you could always tell when it was going
to rain by the direction the wind blew
and he was right, and in this case, you
know, the wind blew from the wrong direction before the rain came, so something
is wrong.
I don't know what their game
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is. All I can say is I think its very
obvious to you that this case is lined up
that "I'll help you and you help me and
let's stick Campbell".
Now the question is: does that evidence
support that?
(T. 923-4).
Since the jury was aware of Ospital's financial
interest

in

the

Campbell

argued

outcome
the

by

the

crossclaim,

bias of the other

and

since

parties and the

apparent collusion between them, little or nothing would be
gained by the disclosure of the settlement, particularly
when considering the procedural safeguards provided by the
court.
C.
The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion In
Excluding The Evidence.
The trial court has "considerable discretion" in
ruling on evidentiary matters, Brambrough v. Bethers, 552
P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976), and alleged errors will result
in a new trial only when the error had a substantial effect
on the outcome of trial.

Id.; Rule 103, Utah R. of Evid.

Rulings

separate

on

motions

for

discretionary.

There

settlement

be

must

trials

is no blanket

admitted

are

similarly

requirement

that a

in all cases, as Campbell

appears to contend.
In Sequoia Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. Halec
Construction Co., 117 Ariz.

11, 570 P. 2d 782 (Ariz.App.
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1977), for example, the non-settling defendant urged, as has
been

urged

here,

that

collusion and resulted

the

settlement

in prejudice.

agreement

lead

to

The court initially

noted that the strategies of the settling parties did not
change as a result of the agreement, and made the following
observations:
CWJe believe a trial court is in a unique
position to view the factors surrounding
such an agreement and to decide, when
requested, whether such an agreement should
be admitted.
The record in this case
reflects the wisdom of such a holding. The
trial court was aware of all the adverse
possibilities inherent in the existence of
the agreement and was fully prepared to
impose sanctions, if necessary, to prevent
injustice, up to and including admitting the
agreement into evidence.
After observing
the conduct of all counsel, their demeanor,
their witnesses, and the overall atmosphere
of the courtroom, the trial judge determined
it unnecessary in this case to disclose the
agreement to the jury. In an instance such
as this, we invest the trial court with considerable discretion.
We find no abuse of
discretion. 570 P.2d at 795.
To similar effect is Vermont Union School District No. 21 v.
H. P. Cummings Construction Co., 469 A. 2d 742

(Vt. 1983),

where

the court noted that proper measures were taken to

avoid

prejudice

and

further

held

settlement was properly excluded.
directed

the

trial

court

not

that

evidence

of

the

The the court explicitly

to

admit

evidence

of

the

settlement on remand.
New trials are granted on the basis of errors in
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evidentiary rulings only when it "clearly appears that the
court so abused

its discretion that there is a likelihood

that injustice resulted." State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942,
944

(Utah 1982).

new

trial

is

Under this standard, it is clear that a

not

warranted

in

this

case.

Indeed,

the

following statement of the trial court, which at all times
was aware of the settlement, alleged collusion and prejudice, stated:

This Court agrees with the jury findings
and would have so found had there not been
a jury.
The only disagreement the Court
would have had if he himself would have
participated in the jury results would be
that the amount of damages were too small.
(R. Bk. IV, 44).
POINT III:

Campbell

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED
ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ORDER
SEPARATE TRIALS

strenuously

argues

that the trial court

should have bifurcated the trial and made Ospital pursue his
cross-claim in a separate proceeding.

This argument fails

for several reasons.
First the Utah Contribution Statute mandates that
in order

for

the settling defendant to be protected

from

contribution claims, the issue of proportionate fault must
be

litigated

action".

"between

joint

tort-feasors

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (2).

in

the

same

This statute has
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recently

been interpreted

by this court in Madsen v. Salt

Lake City School Board, 645 P. 2d 658

(Utah 1982).

In that

casef the plaintiffs sought to exclude a third-party defendant, with whom they had settled, from the main action.

The

court held that the "only basis by which plaintiffs could
relieve

the

contribution

third-party
would

be

defendants

under

the

§ 78-27-43 . . .."

Idk at 663.

"it

that

is

imperative

should be litigated

the

from

express

liability

for

provisions

of

The court further held that

issue of proportionate

fault

between all joint tort-feasors in the

same action and resolved by the same trier of the issues of
fact." ^d. at 663.
Ospital therefore had to be present at trial even
though

plaintiff's

claim

against

Ospital

was

settled.

Further, because of this requirement, there can be no prejudice or abuse of discretion in allowing Ospital to proceed
on his cross-claim.

It Ospital were required to stay in the

action, but not pursue his cross-claim, collateral estoppel
would
issue,

prevent
which

Ospital
would

from

re-litigating

seriously

prejudice

the

liability

Ospitalfs

cross-

claim.
Even
Ospital remain

if

it

were

not

required

by

statute

that

in the trial, the trial court was clearly

within his discretion in not ordering separate trials.

Rule

42(b), Utah R.Civ.P., provides that "The court in further-
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ance

of

separate

convenience

or

trial

.."

.

.

to

avoid

prejudice

may

added)

It

(emphasis

order
is

a

well-

established that this rule sets forth a discretionary standard.

Coleman v. Dillman, 624 P.2d 713

Moore,

Moore's

Federal

Practice

(Utah 1981); S J.

^42.03 ClJ(2d

ed.

1982).

Professor Moore has stated that "the courts have emphasized
that

separate

trials

should

not

be

ordered

unless

such

disposition is clearly necessary;" and further that:
A separate trial should not be granted in
such a case unless the issue is clearly
severable from the other issues in the case
and does not involve the same evidence.
Moore's Federal Practice, ^42-0311]•
On the issue of liability, the cross-claim against
Campbell involved the same evidence as the plaintiff's claim
against Campbell.

All of the witnesses, several from out of

state, were present and ready to testify.

A separate trial

would have required the same witnesses, however, those out
of state witnesses who were willing to voluntarily appear
for the plaintiff, may not be willing
time for Ospitals cross-claim.

to appear a second

Re-litigating the same issue

is expensive, inefficient and unjust to all parties with the
potential for conflicting jury verdicts.

Finally, given the

measures taken by the trial court to prevent prejudice and
protect

the

integrity

of

the

proceedings

would have been gained by a bifurcation.

little

benefit

There was clearly

no abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Appellant Campbell
was given a fair trial and was not prejudiced by any rulings
of the trial court.

Therefore, Respondent Ospital respect-

fully requests that judgment in its favor be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

BRIEF

OF

RESPONDENT

OSPITAL

was

mailed,

postage prepaid, on this /7^day of August, 1984 to:
Wendell E. Bennett
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
W. Scott Barrett
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT SLUSHER
P. 0. Box 465
Logan, UT 84321

V^LK,

JtJtf
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RELEASE OF CLAIMS

For and in consideration of the sum of• $65,000.00,
to me in hand paid by Farmers Insurance Exchange and Allstate
Insurance Company, Robert G. Slusher, (hereinafter sometimes
referred to as "Releasor"), hereby releases and forever discharges
Kenneth W. Brooks, the Estate of Todd Paul Ospital, Farmers
Insurance Exchange, Allstate Insurance Company, and all of
their agents, representatives, affiliates, insurers, successors
and assigns, (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Releasees"),
from any and all claims losses, demands, damages, actions, causes
of action or suits of whatever kind or nature, which now exist
or which may hereafter accrue, because of, for, arising out of,
or in any way connected with the motor vehicle accident which
occurred on or about May 22, 1981, in Sardine Canyon, State Road
91, Cache County, Utah, in which Robert G. Slusher sustained
personal injuries; the facts, circumstances and details of which
are more fully set forth in the files and records of the District
Court of Cache County, State of Utah, in that certain action
entitled:

Robert G. Slusher, plaintiff, vs. Kenneth W. Brooks,

et al., defendants, Civil No. 19910.
Robert G. Slusher does not release, but expressly
preserves any and all claims which he may have against:

Curtis

B. Campbell and/or his-agents and insurers, and any other person
or entity not released hereunder.
r
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It is the express intent of the parties hereto to
relieve Releasees from any liability to make contribution to
any of the other parties in the above legal action or to any
other tort feasor or person whomsoever as contemplated by the
Utah Contribution Among Joint Tort Feasors Act, Utah Code Ann.
§78-27-39, et. seq.

Therefore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§78-27-43, Releasor agrees that receipt of the above recited
consideration and this release reduces any claims which said
Releasor may have against any of said parties or against any
such tort feasor, or any person whomsoever, who may otherwise
be liable to said Releasor as a result of the hereinbefore
described incident said reduction of liability of such party,tort feasor or person to be in the' amount of the consideration
paid for this release, by Releasees, or to the extent of
Releasees1 pro rata share, if any, of Releasor's damages recoverable against all other parties, tort feasors, or other persons,
if such pro rata share is greater than the consideration paid
for this release.

Releasor expressly waives his right to recover

from any party, tort feasor or person for the pro rata share of
Releasor's damages which may be found to have been caused by
the acts or omissions of Kenneth W. Brooks and Todd Paul
Ospital.
It is the express intent of the parties hereto to
relieve the Releasees from any and all liability for any
judgment, for indemnity or contribution arising from or pertainin
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to any claims or damages alleged or set forth in the pleadings
and documents on file in the above identified lawsuit.

Releasor

therefore agrees not to collect from any party or any other
person or entity any amount which such party, person or entity
is legally entitled to collect from Releasees for a judgment,
for indemnity or contribution on such claims or damages.
DATED this

jL

3 £&"

day of June, 1983

*JJL
Rober
Rob ert~ G. S lusher

i^£,

c/?/f3
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